What Would an Informant Tell Me after Reading My Paper? On the Theoretical Significance of Ethical Commitment and Political Transparency in Symmetrical Practice of Studying Religion(s) by Fujda Milan
X X I I I / 2 0 1 5 / 1 / S t u d i e
What Would an Informant Tell Me after 
Reading My Paper? On the Theoretical 
Significance of Ethical Commitment and 
Political Transparency in Symmetrical 
Practice of Studying Religion(s) 
MilaN FujDa*
This paper resulted from my ethnographic research into dance improvi-
sation. Even  though dance improvisation does not have anything inher-
ently in common with religion, it provided a unique chance to test new 
theoretical and methodological approaches which are established in other 
research fields and are now slowly being developed within the study of 
religion. These new research avenues began to emerge a few years back 
during my doctoral research,1 when I started to experience the suffocating 
limits imposed on the study of religion(s) by the very use of the concept 
“religion” as an analytical tool not only for the study of European society 
but also for intercultural comparison. I have presented my argument on 
this issue in an essay entitled “Why Not to Study Religion”.2 In this essay 
I demonstrated how the concept “religion” prevents us from fulfilling 
some important initial aims of the founders of the discipline and how this 
concept brings theoretically counterproductive asymmetries into the re-
search practice. In the following text I will elaborate this argument, take it 
a step further, and present a practical demonstration of the importance and 
implications of subscribing to the principle of symmetry.3 I will try to 
 * I would like to thank my colleagues David Zbíral, Andrea Beláňová, and Jan Krátký 
for their helpful comments to the previous versions of this article. Special thanks go to 
David Mac Gillavry for his carreful language corrections. The text was finished in the 
framework of the project “ITMEPRE – Innovative Theoretical and Methodological 
Perspectives in the Study of Religions” (project No. MUNI/A/1148/2014), hosted at 
the Department for the Study of Religions, Faculty of Arts at Masaryk University.
 1 Milan Fujda, Akulturace hinduismu a formování moderní religiozity: K sociálním 
dějinám českého okultismu 1891-1941, Praha: Malvern 2010.
 2 Milan Fujda, “Proč nestudovat náboženství: K sociologickému uspořádávání 
skutečnosti” [Why Not to Study Religion: On the Sociological Ordering of Reality], 
Sociální studia 10/3, 2013, 13-43.
 3 The concept was first developed in the field of the Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) by David Bloor, “Afterword: Attacks on the Strong Programme”, in: id., 
Knowledge and Social Imagery, Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press 
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show why the symmetrical approach contradicts some established notions 
of value neutrality and political non-engagement while it facilitates theo-
retical objectivity.
I presented the first analysis, based on the data from the above-men-
tioned ethnographic study on dance improvisation, at the conference of the 
European Association for the Study of Religions in Stockholm (2012) in a 
paper entitled “Agency in Instructed Action: A Dance Lesson for the 
Students of Religion”. While revising this paper I discovered some crucial 
analytical problems which led me to reflect systematically on the process 
of data analysis that I employed in that paper. The following demonstra-
tion of the significance of the symmetrical approach is based on this reflec-
tion on the relations between the theoretical significance of ethical com-
mitments and political transparency on one hand, and research objectivity 
on the other.
Before I get to the auto-ethnography, however, I will present a short 
review of the asymmetries inscribed in academic work based on, or utiliz-
ing, the concept “religion”. This is necessary (1) to open up a space for the 
introduction of the complex meaning and implications of the symmetrical 
approach, and (2) to highlight the relevance of studying dance improvisa-
tion (and particularly with regard to the topic of instructed action) within 
the disciplinary boundaries of the academic study of religion(s). This re-
view aims to introduce the concept of insecure practices of pragmatic 
management of uncertainties and ambivalence and its relation to the study 
of religion(s).
Insecure and instrumentally rational practices of problem solving: 
Towards postcolonial study of religion(s) without “religion”
In the spring of 2014 I engaged in a conversation with a choreographer 
and dance teacher of Slovak origin.4 After being asked about my occupa-
tion I explained to him the sociological relevance of dance improvisation 
as a laboratory for studying the ways in which people manage uncertain-
ties. After listening carefully to my explanation of the importance of 
studying the human ability to act in situations characterised by a lack of 
control over the consequences of ongoing (inter)actions, he replied that it 
is rather strange that some people believe that they can control what is 
happening to, and around, them.
21991 (first ed. 1976), 163-185: 175. A detailed introduction to the concept of sym-
metrical study is provided later in this article in the section “Introducing the principle 
of symmetry”.
 4 Informal conversation with the choreographer and dance teacher Milan Kozánek, 
Prague, 26 March 2014.
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Indeed, if early modernity can be characterised by the belief that we can 
build a desired future by rational calculation, prediction and political ac-
tion, supported by scientific knowledge, then understanding late moder-
nity in terms of the risk society5 infers that this belief might have been 
naïve. This reading of Ulrich Beck has far reaching consequences for de-
mocracy and the role of religion in the late modern society. If the early 
modern political process mitigated unpredictability by discarding the 
sources of irrationality (including religion) then, these uncertainties must 
be reintroduced into the political process in the context of the risk society. 
The lack of actual control and the need to improvise thus creates the space 
for the legitimate use of a much wider range of decision-making and 
problem-solving strategies than those understood as rational in the modern 
perspective. Moreover, it highlights the fact that (untested) “tradition”, 
“emotionally based estimation”, “intuition”, “oracles and magic”, “dog-
mas” and “prejudices” have never ceased to be employed in modern poli-
tics.
“Tradition”, “dogmas”, “oracles”, “prejudices” etc. have often been 
related to “religion” in political and scholarly discussions. However, the 
“prejudiced” one has always been the political opponent and the label 
“religious” a way to silence his/her claims. For that reason I prefer to speak 
of insecure practices of pragmatic management of unpredictablities and 
ambivalence.6 At the same time I do not only relate to these practices in 
politics, but also to the management of ordinary everyday personal prob-
lems. The concept of insecure practices is defined by its opposition to in-
strumentally rational practices of pragmatic problem solving. The idea of 
“instrumental rationality” is borrowed from Max Weber. The need to dis-
tinguish between “insecure” and “instrumentally rational” means of prag-
matic problem management lies in the fact that the possibilities of instru-
mentally rational calculation itself are very limited in this realm. Ernest 
Gellner consequently pointed out that various analogies of oracles are 
utilised in modern society while dealing with serious problems where in-
commensurate and multiple criteria enter into the assessment of success. 
“[N]o Delphic oracles are needed in the case of small issues, where reason 
 5 Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp 1986.
 6 I am aware that by speaking of religion in this sense I am limiting the range of the 
meanings it has been given in the field of the study of religion(s). However, I do not 
attempt to construct an all-comprehensive study of religion. I am interested in a limited 
range of issues and use the concept accordingly and without any aim to formulate any 
general statement on what religion is or what the study of religion(s) should be about. 
This kind of discussion I find theoretically unproductive, i.e. not providing any support 
for empirical research.
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prevails,” he says, “but for really big questions, oracle-surrogates remain 
in use.”7
To illustrate the issue at stake I will quote a Facebook status by Helen,8 
one of the dancers in the improvisation project I studied. The status was 
published shortly before the premiere of the performance, which was 
based on a six-month experimentation with various conditions for im-
provisation; “Don’t we want to change the text of the program? I think that 
this nicely expresses our semi-annual achievement :))”. The photograph 
shared below this post contained the following text:
Theory is when you know everything but nothing works.
Practice is when everything works but no one knows why.
In our lab, theory and practice are combined: Nothing works and no one knows why.
This status shows at least three things: First, that six months of hard 
systematic work does not necessarily result in establishing a comprehen-
sive set of instrumentally rational means. Second, that joking is an impor-
tant means of handling the feeling that things are not under control. Third, 
the dancers are not the first ones to deal with such problems and accord-
ingly, they can use publicly available, i.e. institutionalized, cultural re-
sources for humour. Yet, one more thing is implied in the situation and 
supported by further data: namely that joking is just one of the strategies 
for managing a situation, which is defined by unpredictability and the loss 
of control, pragmatically. While joking is a way of freeing some shared 
experience of tension, there are further ways through which people elevate 
tension, provide some measure of assurance, facilitate optimistic expecta-
tions, help to overcome stage fright, and enable themselves to ride through 
events without having full control over them. They do this by acknowledg-
ing the existence of the insecurity and by anticipating possible complica-
tions. Other practices range from “cleaning” the stage and backstage by a 
shaman, distributing good luck-charms, personal good-luck wishing and 
performing collective, supportive rituals in a circle before entering the 
stage. Moreover, these activities occur without the actors feeling obliged 
to have full faith in their efficacy, pondering over the mechanisms behind 
their effects or even knowing how to engage in them correctly.
The only reason we do not see, report and analyse practices of this kind, 
present in everyday ordinary life of our society, is that they are so common 
that we are blind to their existence. They are something we refer to as 
“religion” or “magic” when we encounter them in unusual settings or 
 7 Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
21989, 209-210.
 8 All names from my field notes used in this article are pseudonyms.
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amongst the others, such as the so called “primitives”, but these are defi-
nitely not “religion” or “magic” amongst “civilized” and “modern” people. 
According to Mary Douglas we furthermore tend to believe that while we 
“really” do not believe in the direct material efficacy of such practices, the 
primitives do:
Once when a band of Kung Bushmen had performed their rain rituals, a small cloud 
appeared on the horizon, grew and darkened. Then rain fell. But the anthropologists 
who asked if the Bushmen reckoned the rite had produced the rain, were laughed out 
of court. How naïve can we get about the beliefs of others? Old anthropological 
sources are full of the notion that primitive people expect rites to produce an imme-
diate intervention in their affairs, and they poke kindly fun at those who supplement 
their rituals of healing with European medicine, as if it testified to lack of faith.9
Due to this asymmetry in treating ourselves and them, difficulties arise 
in seeing the pragmatic rationality in such performances and their impor-
tance for our own coping with uncertainty. However, even more important 
is that we are not able to see what Mary Douglas points out clearly here: 
the pragmatic relevance and efficacy of such practices depends on being 
used alongside, and in interplay with, numerous other techniques. In dance 
improvisation this means numerous practical techniques employed as 
means to assess and evaluate the situation on stage, the performance of 
other dancers, the development of the performance, the mood, activity, 
satisfaction and the harmony among performers as well as the mood, en-
gagement and enjoyment of the public, etc. All these techniques are based 
on the experience and sensitivity of the dancers and can hardly be de-
scribed in terms of instrumentally rational control over the process. Yet, 
their employment is perfectly, pragmatically rational, justified and its 
consequences are helpful.
The reason why I went through the discussion above is to show that 
there are two asymmetries at once inscribed in the concept “religion”. The 
one, relatively widely discussed, is the political asymmetry, or more pre-
cisely, the asymmetry based on what Bruno Latour calls the Great Divide 
(between us, moderns, and them, non-moderns).10 The political signifi-
cance of this asymmetry consists in the politically silencing effect of the 
label “religion” and, consequently, the inherent function of creating a 
qualitative difference between us and them, while this qualitative differ-
ence is being conceived as an objective difference between the civilized, 
rational and progressive us, and less civilized, traditional and backward 
 9 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and 
Taboo, London – New York: Routledge 1992 (first ed. 1966), 58.
 10 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 1993, 10-12.
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them. The obstacle such conceptualization constitutes, to the possibility of 
unprejudiced comparative exploration, is clear. This obstacle makes nu-
merous empirically commensurable activities of us and them non-compa-
rable; they cannot get side by side in order to be studied at once through 
mutual comparison due to their classification into mutually exclusive cat-
egories.11
David Bloor formulates this problem within a more general frame:
Our everyday attitudes are practical and evaluative, and evaluations are by their na-
ture asymmetrical. Similarly with our curiosity. Typically things which are unusual 
or threatening attract our attention. Ultimately this is rooted in the physiology of ha-
bituation, the process by which our brains rapidly adapt to background conditions and 
preserve their information processing capacity for whatever breaks the local routine. 
Because much of our background consists of social regularities, this alone is suffici-
ent to ensure that our curiosity is socially structured. The symmetry requirement is 
the call to overcome these tendencies, and to restructure our curiosity. Fortunately, it 
doesn’t require us to transcend the physiological laws of our own nervous tissue, but 
it does require us to reconstruct the local social background to which our curiosity is 
adapted. We can do this by creating new, specialist groups with their own taken-for-
-granted, professional perspective.12
However, there is one more aspect of the above-mentioned asymmetry, 
one related to the previously highlighted tendency to mix insecure prac-
tices of pragmatic management of unpredictability and instrumentally ra-
tional practices of pragmatic problem solving. The modern political pro-
ject is aimed at eliminating such tendencies by excluding religion from the 
field of legitimate sources for argumentation and problem solving in the 
public space. However, as a result of these efforts, risks, which could not 
have been imagined a few decades ago, have come to take up a dominant 
position on the global stage. The establishment of the academic studying 
religion(s) supported the tendency to eliminate crossovers by viewing “re-
ligion” as a special domain of human/social activity and scholarly in-
quiry.13 However, this led to a big paradox: while the actors inevitably mix 
up instrumentally rational and insecure approaches to problems in their 
 11 A more detailed treatment of this problem can be found in M. Fujda, “Proč nestudovat 
náboženství…”, 36. Timothy Fitzgerald analyses this issue with reference to David 
Chidester’s idea that the boundary between religious and non-religious shifts in schol-
arly and lay narrations permanently according to the context. Fitzgerald demonstrates 
it then on the case of treating conformity with sharia law, unlike the conformity with 
Western civic laws, as an act of piety (see Timothy Fitzgerald, “Playing Language 
Games and Performing Rituals: Religious Studies as Ideological State Apparatus”, 
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 15/3, 2003, 209-254: 240-241).
 12 D. Bloor, “Afterword…”, 175-176.
 13 See M. Fujda, “Proč nestudovat náboženství…”; T. Fitzgerald, “Playing Language 
Games...”; Talal Asad, “What Might an Anthropology of Secularism Look Like?”, in: 
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ordinary practices, and their ability to handle ordinary problems of life is 
dependent on their virtuosity in blending these approaches, scholars who 
study these actors work according to the logic of separation of the prac-
tices these actors employ to handle their issues. This is one of the reasons 
why the study of religion systematically fails to explain how religion influ-
ences behaviour, culture and society. The logic of establishing a domain 
for the study of religions prevents the discipline from understanding its 
working principles because these principles are inextricably intertwined 
with blending insecure and instrumentally rational practices, while simul-
taneously (1) excluding the instrumental rational practices from the stud-
ied domain, and (2) excluding a host of insecure practices on the basis of 
their perceived non-religious character. The situation is even more compli-
cated because, by demarcating its field of interest, the discipline inevitably 
sides with the established political order – not as an order of working 
principles but as a social contract or, in the words of Bruno Latour, the 
“modern constitution”.14 Politically neutral and objective study is impos-
sible in these settings. This has important implications: paradoxically and 
quite contrary to modern scientific presumptions, setting the conditions for 
generating more neutral and objective theories through research becomes 
dependent on a set of political and moral choices. Respect for the actors’ 
logic of acting is one of those considerations, and this respect implies giv-
ing up “religion” as a starting point for our inquiries.
The symmetrical approach and postcolonial social science:  
Re-establishing the relation with neighbouring disciplines
Within the study of religion(s) there is a long tradition of postcolonial 
and postmodern criticism inscribed in the discussions concerning the con-
cept “religion”.15 However, methodological reflection on these discus-
id., Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 2003, 21-66.
 14 B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern…, 13-15.
 15 T. Asad, “What Might an Anthropology…”; S. N. Balagangadhara, The Heathen in His 
Blindness: Asia, the West and the Dynamic of Religion, New Delhi: Manohar 2005 
(first ed. Leiden – New York: Brill 1994); Timothy Fitzgerald, “A Critique of 
‘Religion’ as a Cross-Cultural Category“, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 
9/2, 1997, 91-110; id., “Playing Language Games...”; id. (ed.), Religion and the 
Secular: Historical and Colonial Formations, London: Equinox 2007; Richard King, 
Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and “the Mystic East”, 
London: Routledge 1999; Russell T. McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The 
Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia, Oxford – New York: 
Oxford University Press 2003; Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: 
Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism, 
Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press 2005.
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sions, as seen in postmodern and postcolonial criticism in neighbouring 
social sciences like anthropology and sociology since 1970s, is very rare. 
In these disciplines such discussions resulted in the reinterpretation of re-
flexivity, the nature of truth and objectivity through a textual turn16 and in 
an emphasis on the power inequalities embedded in the scientific practice 
of writing texts. Writing, in this interpretation, becomes a practice which 
is considered to be a part of the studied social processes.17 Moreover, the 
following issues were deeply discussed in sociological and anthropologi-
cal reflections on qualitative research: the position of the researcher within 
the field, as a person with body18 and a human identity,19 who has relation-
ships with research participants, and the implications of these relations for 
the quality of the assembled data,20 the transcendence of the limits of 
discourse analysis (so common in the study of religion) by enriching it 
through the ethno-methodological emphasis on studying non-discursive 
ordering practices,21 the approach to mess and the acceptance of it being 
messy as much as is appropriate in a given situation,22 and of course the 
ethics and politics of social scientific inquiry. Moreover, the analysis of 
ethical questions was not limited to the exploitation of the “weaker” in the 
 16 See Zdeněk Konopásek, “Text a textualita v sociálních vědách I: Teoretické motivace”, 
Biograf 7, 1996, 33-45; id., “Text a textualita v sociálních vědách II: Metodologické 
motivace”, Biograf 8, 1996, 9-23; id., “Text a textualita v sociálních vědách III: 
Reflexivní impuls”, Biograf 9, 1996, 7-15. In English, see for example Zdeněk 
Konopásek, “Making Thinking Visible with Atlas.ti: Computer Assisted Qualitative 
Analysis as Textual Practices” [online], Forum: Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research 9/2, 2008, <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.
php/fqs/article/view/420/910>, [21 November 2014].
 17 James Clifford, “Introduction: Partial Truths”, in: James Clifford – George E. Marcus 
(eds.), Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, Berkeley: University 
of California Press 1986, 1-26; Paul Rabinow, “Representations Are Social Facts: 
Modernity and Post-Modernity in Anthropology”, in: James Clifford – George E. 
Marcus (eds.), Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, Berkeley: 
University of California Press 1986, 234-261.
 18 See Elizabeth E. Wheatley, “Risk, Reflexivity and an Elusory Body: Transformations 
in Studying Illness”, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 34/1, 2005, 68-100.
 19 Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, “Fixing and Negotiating Identities in the Field: The 
Case of Lebanese Shiites”, in: Antonius C. G. M. Robben – Jeffrey A. Sluka (eds.), 
Ethnographic Fieldwork: An Anthropological Reader, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell 
22012, 103-113.
 20 Gerald D. Berreman, “Behind Many Masks: Ethnography and Impression Management”, 
in: Antonius C. G. M. Robben – Jeffrey A. Sluka (eds.), Ethnographic Fieldwork: An 
Anthropological Reader, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell 22012, 153-174.
 21 James A. Holstein – Jaber E. Gubrium, “Interpretative Practice and Social Action”, in: 
Norman K. Denzin – Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, Thousand Oaks: SAGE 32005, 483-506.
 22 John Law, After Method: Mess in Social Science Research, New York – Abingdon: 
Routledge 2004.
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name of scientific objectivity and truth,23 and further developed practical 
ways through which to approach the contradictory demands for cultural 
relativism as a fundamental principle of anthropological research and the 
witnessed violence, exploitation and suffering within the studied societies 
and cultures.24
While in anthropology and sociology (with the exception of sociology 
of religion) these discussions culminated in far-reaching changes in meth-
odological and theoretical thinking and in the development of practical 
ways to overcome the troubles highlighted by the postmodern and postco-
lonial critiques of scientific practices, the study of religion(s), it seems to 
me, has not yet found a systematic response to these challenges. Either its 
discussions are still embedded in modernist scientific sensitivity, or the 
postmodern and postcolonial approaches have not led beyond the decon-
structive efforts inspired by Jonathan Z. Smith.25 Despite the brilliance of 
Smith’s analyses, his work remained more deconstructive than construc-
tive. His powerful example led to the creation of an epistemic culture26 in 
which the deconstruction of scholarly practice became an end in itself. 
Even though the importance of this deconstructive effort cannot be denied, 
within the study of religion(s) the necessary next step to reconstruct a basis 
on which to do research has not yet been made.
I believe that subscribing to the methodological principle of symmetry27 
is a step in this direction. Simultaneously, I must point out that the logic 
producing dominance, marginalization, and exploitation, i.e. problems ad-
dressed in postcolonial critique, is quite analogical to the logic of produc-
ing risks in the risk society. That means that the standard modern proce-
dures ignore the existence of such risks, trivialize them, make them 
invisible and complicate the formulation of appropriate solutions for them. 
The problematic role of science in the production of risks in the risk soci-
ety, and its tendency to complicate the identification of these risks and 
their consequent solutions, has been described in detail by Ulrich Beck.28 
 23 Diane Lewis, “Anthropology and Colonialism”, Current Anthropology 14/5, 1973, 
581-602.
 24 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant 
Anthropology”, Current Anthropology 36/3, 1995, 409-440.
 25 Mainly Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown, Chicago 
– London: The University of Chicago Press 1982.
 26 Karin Knorr Cetina, Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge, 
Cambridge – London: Harvard University Press 1999.
 27 It may be useful to highlight that at this point we can speak only about what David 
Bloor calls methodological symmetry which, according to him, can be subscribed to 
while at the same leaving optionally (not necessarily) what he calls psychological and 
logical asymmetries at play (see D. Bloor, “Afterword…”, 176).
 28 An outline of the role of knowledge and science in risk production is provided in U. 
Beck, Risikogesellschaft..., 76-95, a more detailed analysis including also the role of 
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I am drawing this analogy in order to emphasise that postmodern and post-
colonial criticism cannot be overcome by the trivialization of these criti-
cisms and by simply reaffirming the belief in the power of naturalism and 
the early modern scientific project. In this view, “postmodernism” and 
“postcolonialism” are represented as enemies of scientific knowledge.29
While trivialising the relevance of the postmodernist and postcolonialist 
criticism of scientific practices and invoking the epistemological domi-
nance and exclusivity of the early modern scientific project,30 this critique 
and the project it supports has been accompanied by the establishment of 
highly asymmetrical relations between “research subjects”, who subscribe 
to erroneous images of the world, and clever “scientists” who know what 
the world consists of. Such a project aims at explaining why ordinary peo-
ple are naturally predestined to err in their religious beliefs and in the con-
nected practices.31
Contrarily, I want to show in the following part, that the problems posed 
by postmodern and postcolonial criticism can be effectively addressed by 
reflexivity in the risk production and management is presented ibid., 254-299.
 29 An example of such trivialization can be seen in Donald Wiebe, “It’s Never Been 
Better: Comments on the Current State of the Science of Religion”, Religio: Revue pro 
religionistiku 20/2, 2012, 173-192.
 30 Apart from Wiebe’s article, see also the pamphlet by Luther H. Martin and Donald 
Wiebe: Luther H. Martin – Donald Wiebe, “Religious Studies as a Scientific Discipline: 
The Persistence of a Delusion”, Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 20/1, 2012, 9-18, and 
the responses in the same issue. I have borrowed the word “pamphlet” to characterize 
this text from the sophisticated reply by Hubert Seiwert: Hubert Seiwert, “The Study 
of Religion as a Scientific Discipline: A Comment on Luther Martin and Donald 
Wiebe’s Paper”, Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 20/1, 2012, 27-38.
31  This aspect of the issue is clearly stated in the assumptions presented by Martin and 
Wiebe in the above-mentioned paper: “Our first assumption is that the modern western 
research university is a purpose-designed institution for obtaining knowledge about the 
world. The pursuit of this knowledge is successful only when it is not in service of 
ideological, theological and religious agendas. Rather, its primary objective is scien-
tific, that is, to gain public (intersubjectively available) knowledge of public (intersub-
jectively available) facts. Our second assumption is that the study of religion is the 
study of human behaviors that are engaged in because of, or somehow related to, 
a belief in agents that are beyond identification by way of the senses or scientific met-
ric. Our third assumption is that religions are intersubjectively available for analysis 
and that, as Max Weber put it, no incalculable forces need come into play in explaining 
these phenomena. In other words, a scientifically respectable knowledge of religion 
and religions is logically possible. Our fourth assumption is that the current anti-theo-
retical and anti-science posturings of postmodernism have not undermined the credibil-
ity of modern science as a peculiarly successful instrument of inquiry into the character 
of the world, either natural or social. Our fifth and final assumption is that comprehen-
sive scientific study of religion is not likely to be achieved by scattered scientific stud-
ies of one or another aspect of religious thought and behavior by those individual 
scholars who are committed to scientific research on religious thought and behavior” 
(L. H. Martin – D. Wiebe, “Religious Studies as a Scientific Discipline...”, 9-10).
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subscribing to the principle of symmetry. This does, however, imply that 
questions of political and moral engagement might be related, in a surpris-
ing way, to questions of scientific objectivity.
Introducing the principle of symmetry
For David Bloor and his “strong programme” in the sociology of knowl-
edge, the principle of symmetry “seems to fly in the face of common 
sense”,32 yet its embodiment in analytical practice provoked harsh reac-
tions. Bloor deals with these reactions in the afterword to the second edi-
tion of his book Knowledge and Social Imagery. The general formulation 
of the principle of symmetry reads as follows: “The symmetry postulate … 
enjoins us to seek the same kind of causes for both true and false, rational 
and irrational beliefs ...”33 Subscribing to this programme has far-reaching 
consequences. With such an approach, the sociological study of scientific 
knowledge is possible – and can be conducted – in the same manner as 
sociological study of knowledge practices of “ordinary” people in ordinary 
situations. For students of religion an interesting point might be that 
Bloor’s critical analysis of the assumption, hitherto taken for granted, that 
scientific knowledge lies outside the sphere of legitimate scientific – so-
ciological – reflection, was intimately related to the study of religion.
The very question at the outset of Bloor’s strong programme was: “Can 
sociology of knowledge investigate and explain the very content and na-
ture of scientific knowledge?” Bloor supposed that, if sociology is capable 
of studying primitive cosmologies scientifically, than the study of “cos-
mologies” of our own culture might be the next natural step. Unfortunately, 
sociologists were reluctant to make that step. Sociologists of knowledge, 
he says, “have been only too eager to limit their concern with science to 
its institutional framework and external factors relating to its rate of 
growth or direction. This leaves untouched the nature of knowledge thus 
created.”34 This reluctance took place despite the hints in the direction of 
the strong programme made by Émile Durkheim’s study The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life where he shows, according to Bloor, “how a 
sociologist can penetrate to the very depth of a form of knowledge ... [and 
drops] a number of hints as to how his findings might relate to the study 
of scientific knowledge. The hints have fallen on deaf ears”.35
Another aspect relating the strong programme to studying religion rises 
out of the accidental (sic!) analogy between two debates: one provoked by 
 32 D. Bloor, “Afterword…”, 175.
 33 Ibid.
 34 D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery..., 3.
 35 Ibid., 4.
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the publication of Bloor’s book, the other provoked a century earlier by 
theologians at the Tübingen school and their approach to the historical 
study of the Church’s dogma. In Bloor’s words, the approach of Christian 
Baur aimed at overcoming “supernaturalism”, which means that dogma 
had two parts and each of them was studied different way. “One part is the 
record of authentically apostolic truth. This flows from divine sources, and 
needs no other explanation beyond its divinity. The other part is the record 
of heresy and doctrinal deviation. This is to be accounted for by everything 
that can cloud the vision of the faithful and lead them astray. Here explana-
tion is in terms of ambition, greed, ignorance, superstition and evil.”36 
Consequently, the argument used against Baur may be formulated as fol-
lows: “When a Christian believes what is orthodox, we need enquire no 
further into the causes of his belief, whereas when he believes what is in 
fact heretical – even if he believes it to be orthodox – we require some 
further explanation.”37
Bloor has further demonstrated this strange analogy by quoting one of 
his critics: “When a thinker does what is rational to do, we need enquire 
no further into the cause of his action, whereas when he does what is in 
fact irrational – even if he believes it to be rational – we require some 
further explanation.”38 In this context Bloor admits that “[w]hen I argued 
in chapter 3 that we protect science from sociological scrutiny by treating 
it as sacred, I spoke more truly than I knew. The strong programme first 
emerged in connection with sacred rather than scientific beliefs, and the 
arguments used against it then were exactly those used now”.39
This is precisely the reason why Bloor emphasises the aspect of seeking 
the same kind of causes for both, true and false, rational and irrational 
beliefs.40 For the same reason John Law emphasizes that:
the principle of symmetry suggests that there is no privilege – that everything can be 
analysed, and that it can (or should) be analysed in the same terms. So it erodes dis-
tinctions that are said to be given in the nature of things, and instead asks how it is 
that they got to be that way. ... It says, in effect, that we shouldn’t take orders at face 
value. Rather we should treat them as the outcome of ordering.41
However, this element of subverting the established order “invariably 
subverts the dominant view and strengthens the side of the weak and the 
 36 D. Bloor, “Afterword…”, 184.
 37 Ibid., 184-185.
 38 Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth, 
London: Routledge – Kegan Paul 1977, 188-189 (quoted from D. Bloor, “Afterword…”, 
184).
 39 D. Bloor, “Afterword…”, 184.
 40 A more detailed argument with reference to symmetrical study of religion can be found 
in my article: M. Fujda, “Proč nestudovat náboženství...”, 35-37.
 41 John Law, Organizing Modernity, Oxford – Cambridge: Blackwell 1994, 12.
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marginal … [It is a] way of [methodologically motivated] siding with the 
oppressed”, adds Dick Pels.42 This is the core of the previously mentioned 
political decision, which is necessary to practice the symmetrical approach 
as a way to facilitate objectivity. As will become clear from my further 
argumentation, making such a decision is easier than turning it into prac-
tice.43
However, one more ethical and theoretical consideration is required. 
This consideration involves the choice to study scientific research as one 
would study any other human activity. This concept, which was inspired 
by ethno-methodology, I will introduce through an account of my own 
research into dance improvisation. Doing dance improvisation is definitely 
something different than doing ethnography. However, during dance im-
provisation, the actors do need to use a whole range of practices related to 
assessing facts, interpreting and evaluating the ongoing events, generating 
general knowledge out of their engagement and reactions of the other ac-
tors, while simultaneously transforming it into a working experience in-
scribed into the body, written into a notebook or a textbook or into school 
curricula. In other words, they do quite the same thing as I do as a re-
searcher and they – like me – do it all the time and systematically.44 So 
there is a difference, but this difference is not qualitative, there is no 
Latourian “Great Divide”. As Zdeněk Konopásek pointed out, the only 
empirically available difference between scientific and ordinary practices 
is a quantitative difference. What scientists make use of, and what makes 
their analyses more detailed, accurate, better justified, more thoroughly 
elaborated etc. is their access to, and actual employment of, tools from a 
much vaster pool of resources. These resources range from the richness of 
the tradition of theorising (on which scientists build their own work and 
which they access through libraries and scientific databases), the sophisti-
cated and long-time development of analytical tools such as analytical 
software, a richer scope of human resources at universities and research 
institutes, expensive and specialized equipment serving their needs, finan-
cial resources, and of course the available work time.45 Indeed one can 
only be surprised by seeing the epistemic precision with which people (in 
 42 Dick Pels, “The Politics of Symmetry”, Social Studies of Science 26/2, 1996, 277-304: 
282.
 43 A number of problems concerning following the principle of symmetry were analysed 
also by D. Pels, “The Politics of Symmetry...”, 277-304.
 44 Concerning this issue see Harold Garfinkel, “Common Sense Knowledge of Social 
Structures: The Documentary Method of Interpretation in Lay and Professional Fact 
Finding”, in: id., Studies in Ethnomethodology, Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1967, 
76-103.
 45 See Zdeněk Konopásek, “Sociologie jako power play”, Sociológia 28/2, 1996, 99-126: 
113-116, 119-120.
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this case dancers) deal with the issues they are faced with. They really 
need to understand these issues clearly for practical reasons and are ex-
perts in doing so. In addition, there is no better guide for scholars who try 
to understand a problem than the actors themselves and the theories they 
teach him/her so that he/she can become oriented. That is one of the rea-
sons why social researchers may need to develop good and close relations 
with the “subjects” in their research. Good and close relations have some-
thing to do with symmetrical relations. Practical reasons for doing so will 
be seen in the demonstration presented in the section “The story of a tiny 
explosion” which will follow after opening the problem of relations among 
politics, ethics, and objectivity in the following part.
Moral and political engagement and objectivity
There seems to be a paradox in social scientific research. There is a 
widespread intuition that, when moral values enter the analytical process, 
the theoretical quality of its outcome, treated mostly through the concept 
of objectivity, becomes threatened. On the other hand, as Max Weber has 
pointed out a century ago, without subscribing to particular ethical values 
or a political stance, we are unable to formulate our research problems.46 
Weber’s solution for this paradox is twofold: on the one hand, Weber does 
not take the concept of “objectivity” in its naïve positivist sense all that 
serious, which is why he consistently mentions it in quotation marks. On 
the other hand, he is very serious about the scientific quality of research 
outcomes and the difference between analysis and moral evaluation of the 
subject.47 Furthermore, he divides the scientific analysis itself, and the 
sphere of politics that uses scientific results.48 With reference to this issue 
he draws a sharp distinction between moral and political engagements as 
a necessary condition for the set up of any research on the one hand and 
methodological objectivity which, for him, meant the value-free and tech-
nically controlled process of concept construction on the other. The notion 
of “ideal types” was developed within this theoretical framework. 
Furthermore, Weber demonstrated that, using ideal types as technical ana-
lytical tools warrants objectivity, while improper handling of ideal types 
changes them into theoretically useless tools of moral evaluation. Taking 
Weber’s statements seriously and clinging to the idea that the research can 
 46 Max Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy”, in: id., The 
Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. Edward A. Shils – Henry A. Finch, Illinois: 
The Freepress of Glencoe 1949, 50-112: 61-81.
 47 Ibid., 96-99.
 48 Ibid., 54-57.
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be done in a better or a worse way,49 just as any other craft,50 I would like 
to complicate the issue somewhat more. While Weber makes some gen-
eral points which can still inspire us a century later, he completely omitted 
the problem of the researcher as a person whose work is greatly dependent 
on his/her moral relations with the people, texts, artefacts etc. he/she “con-
nects [with] through some research protocol”,51 and on the moral qualities 
of this research protocol itself. Of course, he was not doing ethnographical 
research, and this problem was therefore not so apparent to him. This does 
however not infer that researchers dealing with archival documents, are 
exempt from this problem. It only means that, for historians and quantita-
tive or theoretical sociologists, the problem is less visible. The reasons for 
this, will be presented in the final part of this paper, and have to do with 
the fact that the problem of dominance of a scientist over the participants 
 49 I am mentioning this because of serious misunderstandings based on the lack of knowl-
edge of postmodern discussions and on misidentifying postmodernism with the idea 
that “anything goes”, interpreted in the way that postmodernists would deny any means 
of distinguishing the quality of different research outcomes. Putting it metaphorically, 
the critics, horrified by the expression “anything goes”, think that postmodernists say 
that we do not have any means to distinguish between tasty and nutritious food on the 
one hand, and poor or spoiled one on the other, as well as between good and careless 
cooks. But postmodernists are quite normal people with a sound sense of taste and 
limited digestive capacities. What they say is only that one does not need to prefer 
German cuisine (for example because he or she may be French, Italian or Indian), but 
this does not imply that German cuisine does not produce food, but only crap. German 
food is nutritious and even tasty, at least for numerous Germans and many non-Ger-
mans. The same applies to systems of knowledge production. All of them, for the 
people who actively use the knowledge thus produced, provide usable knowledge. And 
of course, the fact that knowledge is used – otherwise there would be no reason to 
produce it – means that it has some effects, it solves problems as well as creates trou-
bles. The knowledge we produce in modern societies make us able to produce nice cars 
together with traffic jams and air pollution, refrigerators together with well-preserved 
food and the diminishing ozone layer, Hinduism together with the Indian movement for 
svarajya as well as Hindu nationalism and Muslim-Hindu riots. If somebody sees only 
cars, but not traffic jams and polluted air, or if he or she conceives a nice result as a 
true one, while those undesirable as mere temporary drawbacks along the way to per-
fection, than this might have something to do with the belief in linear progress, which 
is a kind of material theology of salvation. Postmodernists are sceptical about instant 
ways to salvation, which is one of the things distinguishing them from modernists.
 50 The metaphor of scientific research as a craft is borrowed here from Charles W. Mills, 
“On Intellectual Craftsmanship”, in: id., The Sociological Imagination, Oxford – New 
York: Oxford University Press 2000 (first ed. 1959), 195-226.
 51 Bruno Latour, “On Recalling ANT”, in: John Law – John Hasard (eds.), Actor Network 
Theory and After, Oxford – Malden: Blackwell – The Sociological Review 1999, 15-
24: 20. I am quoting this Latour’s wording to avoid speaking about studying someone. 
I want to highlight a point that will soon become clearer: that the relation in question 
is much more complex than just to study or to be studied (see Z. Konopásek, “Text a 
textualita v sociálních vědách III...”; id., “Text a textualita v sociálních vědách II...”).
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in his or her research is not so urgent in the field itself (where power rela-
tions can be quite the opposite)52 as it is in the phase of data analysis and 
in the process of writing.53
The distinction between setting the research objectives (the procedure 
in which ethical and political choices are inevitably present) and method-
ology (the set of procedures which should be void of moral values) is ac-
cepted by the social scientific mainstream as a standard and sufficient so-
lution to the problem. We have, however, learned from postcolonial 
authors such as Edward Said,54 Dipesh Chakrabarty,55 Gayatri Chakraborty 
Spivak,56 Ranajit Guha,57 Morny Joy,58 Immanuel Wallerstein59 and oth-
ers that moral and political engagement on the level of research objectives, 
combined with “objective” methodological procedures provides a power-
ful tool for domination over studied peoples. It facilitates their marginali-
zation and the legitimization of neglect towards their needs and interests, 
as well as the establishment of rule over them. Timothy Fitzgerald has 
shown how “Religious Studies departments and journals are, or are similar 
to, ritual institutions that reproduce a dominant concept of the social order, 
in this case liberal capitalism”.60 As such they are doing something not 
usually referred to when stressing the theoretical objectivity of the scien-
tific endeavour. Postcolonial theorists thus challenge claims to objectivity 
by showing how it often serves, in various ways, as a pretext for domina-
tion and exploitation. This does however mean that methodology itself can 
apparently not be impartial in situations where it is not able to neutralize 
the partiality of the research objective. Consequently, this casts doubts 
 52 See Z. Konopásek, “Sociologie jako power play...”; Markéta Vaňková, “Výzkumník 
lapený: Úvahy k (a)symetrii vztahů mezi výzkumníkem a zkoumaným”, Biograf 52-53, 
2010, 103-118; Andrea Beláňová, “S kým povedu dialog? Vyjednávání o rolích 
v terénním výzkumu”, Biograf 57, 2012-2013, 83-100; Kamila Velkoborská, 
“Reflecting on Reflecting in the Study of Contemporary Pagan and Magical Ritual”, 
Religio: Revue pro religionistiku 22/2, 2014, 211-232.
 53 P. Rabinow, “Representations Are Social Facts...”.
 54 Edward Said, Orientalism, London – New York: Penguin 1995 (first ed. 1978).
 55 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Political 
Difference, Princeton – Oxford: Princeton University Press 2008.
 56 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, in: Cary Nelson – Lawrence 
Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana – Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press 1988, 271-313.
 57 Ranajit Guha, “Dominance Without Hegemony and Its Historiography”, in: id. (ed.), 
Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on South Asian History and Society, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press 1989, 210-309.
 58 Morny Joy, “Postcolonial Reflections: Challenges for Religious Studies”, Method and 
Theory in the Study of Religions 13/2, 2001, 177-195.
 59 Immanuel Wallerstein, European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power, New York – 
London: The New Press 2006.
 60 T. Fitzgerald, “Playing Language Games...”, 212.
73 What Would an Informant Tell Me after Reading My Paper?…
upon any claims of “objectivity” of a theory or method and leads to the 
suspicion that such claims are nothing more than instruments for the le-
gitimization of cruelty and immoral treatment of the oppressed and mar-
ginalized. The necessary partiality and moral engagement related to for-
mulating the research problem seem to dominate over the impartiality and 
disengagement of the research procedures.
This might suggest that the Weberian framework does not provide tools 
sensitive enough to deal with the complex problems related to ethics, 
politics, objectivity, and the quality of theory in social inquiry. In the fol-
lowing story of problems with asymmetry in my analysis of instructed 
action I would like to demonstrate some of the relations between ethics, 
politics, and theory, and to show how bringing clear political and ethical 
decisions into a research process can enhance the quality of theory, includ-
ing its objectivity. The meaning of objectivity, however, will shift a little 
bit. By focusing on the relations between ethics, politics, and theory, I will 
explore how to engage with the other side of the postcolonial coin. If 
moral failures in the process of theory-building make the theory persuasive 
only to those who share the same political objectives as the scholars, then 
the particular political, theoretical and moral decisions, with respect to the 
people we engage with in research, might be more relevant and fruitful to 
a much more heterogeneous collective. In other words, morally fair treat-
ment might result in a fairer theory, i.e. one more in accordance with the 
classical liberal notion of maximum utility for a maximum of citizens. 
This formulation indicates that scientific truth has much to do with democ-
racy. To claim objectivity and universality, for a theory backing and le-
gitimizing the fulfilment of partial interests of the privileged few at the 
expense of the many who must bear the consequences, does not make 
much sense. But then, resistance and siding with the weaker61 seem to be 
a theoretically more appropriate starting point than siding with those cur-
rently profiting from the established order. This is very important because 
it emphasizes the intermingling of “truth” and society.
The belief that “other” societies have only “cultures”, while we, the 
Moderns, have “Culture” and “Nature” at once, defines what Latour calls 
the Great Divide62 we have created between Us and Them – the primitive 
(and oriental) others. The “Nature” on our side justifies our truth claims, 
as was shown above when explaining Bloor’s definition of, and reasons 
for, subscribing to the principle of symmetry. As a silent witness, nature 
attests, by its own virtue, to our truth, and makes us believe that, that which 
is “rational” needs no further inquiry while the “irrational” claims need 
 61 See N. Scheper-Hughes, “The Primacy of the Ethical...”, 420.
 62 B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern…, 24-48, 91-129.
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a “social explanation”.63 The same Great Divide makes us oblivious to our 
own mixing of “rational” and “irrational” approaches to handle problems 
and uncertainty.64 This is one important feature of what Latour calls the 
European critical stance. This strategy of the moderns to perpetuate their 
dominance, as Latour shows, is based on a rigorous separation of the con-
stant work of purification of hybrids (of nature and culture) and the con-
stant work of the mediation of these hybrids. These two practices, accord-
ing to Latour “must remain distinct if they are to remain effective”. 65 
Their separation defines for him what it means to “be modern”. 66 In this 
sense, the modern social scientific practice is helplessly asymmetrical and, 
far from any chance of being objective. 
The story of a tiny explosion: On the difficulties of practising the 
symmetrical approach
The story I am going to narrate relates to my research into contemporary 
dancers during their work on a performance based on improvisation. In 
order to build an improvisation on a particular theme, the dancers experi-
mented with different rules by which to define particular situations. The 
sets of these rules would eventually form the basic structure of the impro-
vised performance. In addition, the whole project served as a dance re-
search of human interactions; the experiments during dance trainings were 
mainly about exploring what will happen in interactions among dancers if 
their possibilities of action were limited through a particular set of instruc-
tions. The ultimate goal of the project was to explore and represent on 
a stage, what is going on in a situation where people have to carry out 
relatively common tasks with no a priori assigned roles to perform. 
Accordingly, the performance ought to mostly be about negotiation and 
the establishment of order within a group which is forced to cooperate on 
a common task.
The problem I focus on in this particular part of my analysis of in-
structed action, concerns the difficulties in achieving a shared understand-
ing of an instruction. My analysis shows which uncontrolled and unpre-
dictable factors influence the way the instruction is interpreted and carried 
out, and the way all the participants, especially the instructing choreogra-
 63 See above the paragraphs on “Introducing the principle of symmetry” and the second 
half of the chapter “Insecure and instrumentally rational practices of problem solving: 
Towards postcolonial study of religion(s) without ‘religion’”.
 64 See the section “Insecure and instrumentally rational practices of problem solving: 
Towards postcolonial study of religion(s) without ‘religion’” above.
 65 B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern..., 10.
 66 Ibid., 10-12.
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pher, are forced to improvise almost every second of the instructed activ-
ity. This improvisation occurred time and again despite the fact that the 
two choreographers spent many hours planning the instructions in order to 
make the dancers develop particular kinds of interactions and create par-
ticular kinds of situations.
Once, during one activity called “the tree”, a dancer called Lenka di-
verted relatively consistently, as I have learned, from most of the other 
dancers, and especially from the choreographer’s idea. In doing so, she 
made Šárka, the choreographer, adjust her instructions more often than the 
other dancers did. In one case “the tree” activity was even more problem-
atic than usual. The task was twofold: first the dancers were instructed to 
imagine a tree strongly rooted in a rock and to explore and represent its 
shape and movement through the movement of their bodies. Lenka’s ex-
pression of the tree was particularly dissatisfying to Šárka, who formulated 
her dissatisfaction in terms of not believing Lenka “to feel it like that”, and 
suspecting her of reproducing a merely “empty form”. Second, the dancers 
were to set themselves under the tree and after getting ready to move out 
into space, locate something they desperately need, catch it, and return 
back to the protected spot under the tree. While locating the “thing they 
need”, the dancers were expected, by the choreographer, to get into inter-
actions. However, they did not and the activity – from the point of view of 
the choreographer – had completely failed.
Subsequent discussions clarified that the problem lied in the under-
standing of particular concepts used in the instruction and thus in divergent 
definitions of the situation/activity by each participant. Some of the danc-
ers reported to have got perplexed by Šárka’s expression “getting into 
contact” used in her instruction. During most of the previous trainings 
“getting into contact” meant a very general instruction, which asked of the 
dancers to enter into whatever kind of contact. However, due to the fact 
that some of the dancers were trained in classical and modern dance rather 
than contemporary partnering and contact improvisation, Šárka had begun 
to introduce more activities aimed at contact in the technical sense of shar-
ing weight. This form of improvisation was inspired by Aikido and its 
principles of utilizing the energy of the opponent as well as the self. 
Therefore, most dancers understood the instruction to mean that they 
should start performing some kind of contact improvisation. Such instruc-
tions, however, seemed incompatible with the situation they experienced 
when establishing an intimate connection with the tree in their imagination 
and then moving away from it and returning to it. They did not feel any 
possibility, nor for that matter necessity, to interact with anybody else, 
especially in the above-mentioned technical sense. Such a possibility 
seemed quite incompatible with their experience in the given situation.
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At first I understood the problem with Lenka’s tree as an instance of an 
analogical lack of consensus on the meaning of an instruction. As she 
mentioned in a discussion in the cafeteria, the problem presumably derived 
from the fact that she interpreted the instruction for “the tree” activity 
through her experience with the same activity as it was carried out seven 
and half months earlier, at a weekend workshop during which the chore-
ographers experimented with some interested dancers and the work style 
they planned to apply in this project. However, during that workshop the 
activity was not guided by either of the two choreographers but by Alena, 
a person who initiated the project but participated in it in a different role: 
as a visual artist responsible for the scene design. This workshop had 
taken place before the intensive project with a selected group of dancers 
started. Consequently, the problems seemed to be caused by a lack of con-
sensus on the meaning of the instructions due to different presuppositions 
of various participants concerning the definition of situation. The lack of 
consensus seemed to result from the divergent ways of integrating shared 
experiences (with the instruction and the activity) in their individual bio-
graphies.
Yet, there was something that dissatisfied me when I was rereading my 
account of the situation in the paper I presented at a conference in 
Stockholm. Lenka was definitely an important actor who caused interest-
ing things to happen. That observation led me to create the code “Lenka” 
with an automated coding function in the qualitative data analysis applica-
tion I was using, in order to get deeper insight into what was happening 
around this dancer. I felt that something had to be wrong if my account 
made Lenka look like a trouble-maker who does things wrong all the time. 
So, I started to ask myself what she might tell me after reading my text. I 
had good reason for doing so. Once I made her angry by asking her some 
questions I needed to confront her with in order to test some of my provi-
sional interpretations of what was going on in the field. I innocently told 
her that it seemed to me that she suffered a lot during the project and that 
I thought she had found a very respectable way to finally withdraw from 
the project as a dancer, and I asked her what she thought of this interpreta-
tion. She harshly replied to my question by saying that she was not ready 
to read anything about her suffering in my articles, and refused to discuss 
this issue any further.
This moment was very important because, at the onset of the research, 
I made clear to all participants that they could refrain from participation at 
any time. Moreover, it would imply that I would delete all passages, which 
mentioned this particular participant, from my field notes. As a result, 
“what she might tell me” turned into a pressing personal question for me 
as a researcher who is interested in having as rich a dataset as possible. My 
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ethical commitment to the participants required me to consider the issues 
of symmetry in our relationships more carefully. It empowered Lenka 
politically in relation to my research.
While editing the text, I had to consider what Lenka might say, if she 
were sitting next to me. I realized that, over the course of my analysis of 
“the tree” exercise, I had deleted two important quotes from my field notes 
from the particular “network view” in the analytical software I was using. 
This deletion was an important decision running against the automatic 
feature of the software to simply load all the quotes associated with a par-
ticular code into the network view. The decision I made was not com-
pletely justified. I felt that the quotes said something relevant to the prob-
lem I was analysing in this network view. These quotes were interlinked 
with other quotes in the view by further relations, not just by the code 
alone. However, I repeatedly decided that these quotes were essential with 
reference to a different aspect of the problem, and that I would come back 
to them later.
These quotes dealt with a discussion between Šárka and Lenka concern-
ing the aesthetic quality of dance. While Šárka maintained a theory which 
emphasised the ability of the dancers to express their feelings and emo-
tions through movement, Lenka emphasised the spatial and figurative as-
pects of the movements, and therefore its visual quality. In relation to this, 
I have also found quotes in which Alena, the visual artist responsible for 
scene design who guided the tree activity during the weekend workshop, 
expressed a similar aesthetic theory of dance. Alena explained to me that 
this aesthetic theory drove her activities in dance and land-art. The crucial 
aspect of the discussion between Lenka and Šárka was that they did not 
reach a consensus on their aesthetic theory. The problem was closed by 
their mutual agreement concerning their right to have divergent opinions.
This discovery led to further discoveries, especially to the recognition 
of the importance of power relations between the dancers and the choreog-
raphers, and the dependency of these relations on a particular setting. 
While a world-famous choreographer like Akram Khan can choose those 
dancers who fit well into his idea of the planned opening ceremony at the 
Olympics in London from a virtually unlimited pool of dancers, Šárka, 
working in the context of a local amateur dance project with a signifi-
cantly smaller pool of possible participants, often expressed the necessity 
to work with the people she had at her disposal. However, while express-
ing this, she also repeatedly mentioned that she preferred the working 
process to its result. She was certainly becoming less steady in this ap-
proach as the date of the public performance was approaching, and yet it 
was an important aspect of the whole project. For the choreographers as 
well as the dancers, the project was a kind of experiment. However this 
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experiment included a commitment towards the audience. The audience 
should grasp and enjoy the final outcome (whatever that might be). The 
dancers and choreographers repeatedly asked the question, whether they 
should make the performance more audience-friendly, or whether they 
should let the audience cope with a difficult piece, if necessary. This ques-
tion was not easy to answer with assurance, but the dancers and choreog-
raphers tended to prefer not oversimplifying the task for the audience.
Let us return to the passages I have repeatedly neglected, and which 
finally shed new light on the problems under scrutiny. My commitment to 
find a proper symmetrical treatment of the participants, especially with 
regard to Lenka in my narrative, helped me to realize the importance of 
power relations for the course of instructed action. Lenka, as my notes 
justify, could not carry out some activities in a way that contradicted her 
aesthetic theory; not because she would be so dogmatic about this theory, 
but because it was inscribed in her body, her senses and feelings, and her 
identity. Doing things differently would run strongly against her habitus.67 
It would of course be possible, but it would mean a huge investment of 
effort. Such an investment, on the other hand, demands an acceptance of 
the view that things should really be changed for one’s own sake. This did 
not happen, given that the controversy between Lenka and Šárka over their 
aesthetic theories had not reached a consensus. They have discussed the 
issue at length but, as mentioned above, the outcome was a formulation of 
their mutual right to a divergent view. As a result, there was no pressure 
for change nor for any sufficient (from Lenka’s perspective) justification 
for pressure.
In addition, this aspect shows one of the demarcating lines between 
professional and part-time settings. In a professional setting the relations 
between choreographers and dancers are more unambiguous and the de-
pendence on salary related to the project or company, provides a strong 
incentive to engage in hard work on personal development, which is a 
crucial aspect of the artistic craft. When, on the other hand, one is dedicat-
ing her or his free time to a project and has not much more than fun and 
friendship as a reward for her or his engagement, breaking the bodily and 
discursive habits (two things which work rather as one in the given situa-
tion) becomes much more demanding, and thus based on different ways of 
reasoning and management than in professional settings.
Through the above narrated story I aimed to demonstrate how increased 
sensitivity to asymmetries can help identify certain levels of complexity 
 67 Marcel Mauss, “Les techniques du corps”, Journal de Psychologie 32/3-4, 1936, 271-
293. Quoted from an electronic version at Les classiques des sciences sociales, <http://
dx.doi.org/doi:10.1522/cla.mam.tec>, [16 September 2015], 7.
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which otherwise would not be visible. Emphasising respect towards Lenka 
together with setting conditions in which she was able to significantly in-
fluence which data would be preserved and which would have to be de-
leted, helped to increase the theoretical solidity of the analysis. The ques-
tion is thus: why was I not able to see the role of the body and identity, 
power relations and habitus from the onset?
The answer is relatively simple. I spent much more time with the cho-
reographers then with the dancers. I was present during all their discus-
sions concerning the ongoing project and the planning of training situa-
tions. As a result, I was effectively socialized into their perspective on 
what was going on during the trainings – so effectively that my field notes 
expressed a kind of joy related to my ability to see what dancers were do-
ing wrong. This ability seemed to be empirically verified by the choreog-
raphers’ comments, which I diligently noted down while observing the 
dancers in training. This way I was easily persuaded to take the power 
relations in the field for granted. I have subscribed to the notion that the 
choreographers are right while the dancers might be either right or wrong, 
I learned what satisfied the choreographers, and interpreted potential in-
compatibilities in actions of others and their disagreements from the cho-
reographers’ perspective. I needed Lenka to “strike back”68 at my com-
ment on her suffering, to realize this. This act of “striking back” thus 
proved to work as an ethically – and, due to the openly stated right of any 
participant to withdraw from the research at any time, also politically – 
enabled interaction between the participant and the researcher; it worked 
out as the tool of empirical falsification of an emerging theory.
This does however not mean that researchers should not accept the roles 
and hierarchies in the field. The roles and hierarchies are part of the ongo-
ing interaction and play a crucial role in achieving the aim of the coopera-
tion. The asymmetry lies in the fact that the researcher adopts views from 
the perspective of particular roles and their place in the social hierarchies 
as a cornerstone of his/her analysis.
In terms used in the preceding parts: she/he accepts a particular order as 
an a priori, and privileges it over analysing how the order came into being 
or how it is practised. This way, researchers are likely to become blind to 
the “good reasons” of the less privileged actors, and consequently to be 
unable to grasp the ongoing interactions with respect to all the crucial fac-
tors involved. Despite the fact that we might prefer the view of a particular 
party, the analysis should not be founded on the idea that those who think 
 68 The concept of “striking back” is based on Bruno Latour’s work. See Bruno Latour, 
“When Things Strike Back”, British Journal of Sociology 51/1, 2000, 107-123. I will 
come back to “striking back” below.
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and act otherwise are simply wrong, “trouble makers”, stupid or irrational. 
Quite to the contrary, ascribing normality and rationality (in the sense of 
having “good reasons”, however contradictory to the “good reasons” of 
others, or even contradictory to the desired implications of one’s own ac-
tion) to all the actors, and taking their reasons into account, can help us 
deepen the analysis. This forces us to understand social action through the 
chaotic interplay between actors in which divergent definitions of the situ-
ation, misunderstandings, clarifications of each other’s stance, etc., strong-
ly influence the outcome. This is consistent with the statement by William 
and Dorothy Thomas that: 
Very often it is the wide discrepancy between the situation as it seems to others and 
the situation as it seems to the individual that brings about the overt behavior diffi-
culty. To take an extreme example, the warden of Dannemora prison recently refused 
to honor the order of the court to send an inmate outside the prison walls for some 
specific purpose. He excused himself on the ground that the man was too dangerous. 
He had killed several persons who had the unfortunate habit of talking to themselves 
on the street. From the movement of their lips he imagined that they were calling him 
vile names, and he behaved as if this were true. If men define situations as real, they 
are real in their consequences.69
Therefore, the definition of a situation by one particular actor is not suf-
ficient to properly understand the course of action. To analyse the situation 
demands all the actors involved to be taken serious and to let their differ-
ences and agreements shed light on what is actually happening and why. 
In fact the researcher has no other tool to develop an empirically grounded 
understanding than to follow these interplays of interactions and their tem-
porary outcomes. The only other possibility to develop this understanding 
is by speculating on the basis of one’s own experiences. Some speculation 
can free the imagination, foster sensitivity and orient oneself amidst an 
overkill of textual material to be analysed. However, speculation which is 
not directly related to mapping of the scene by mutual interactions, nego-
tiations and controversies and their outcomes70 can hardly result in more 
than subjective fantasy.
 69 William I. Thomas – Dorothy S. Thomas, “The Methodology of Behavior Study”, in: 
iid., The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs, New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf 1928, 553-576: 572.
 70 This idea of controversies as maps to be followed by the analyst is taken from Bruno 
Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2005, 31-32. Latour furthermore relates this strategy of map-
ping with constructing the “social context”. He argues that it is not the analyst’s task to 
add the context by himself to the analysis since the actors themselves are engaged all 
the time in mapping their position in which they operate and the nature of their ties, and 




The space for “striking back” which I described above as a result of 
Lenka’s ethical and political empowerment brings us to Bruno Latour’s 
reformulation of the concept of scientific objectivity. This reformulation is, 
furthermore, based on subscribing to the principle of symmetry. As I will 
show, the idea of “striking back” enables us to find more sensitive tools to 
grasp the relationships between ethics, politics, and theory. It enables us to 
add moral relationships with participants in research into the analysis, and 
to grasp the research problem in a way that respects that our results are 
produced by ordinary practices, however quantitatively different71 from 
everyday ordinary practices of non-experts. When speaking of “striking 
back”, Latour returns to his experience with natural scientists, who ob-
jected to his accounts of the social construction of scientific facts. This 
situation became decisive for him and led him to the reconstruction of the 
notion of social construction. This achievement is related to Latour’s 
criticism of the practice of social explanation:
After two centuries of easily explaining away the behavior and beliefs of farmers, the 
poor, fetishists, fanatics, priests, lawyers, and businessmen whose anger was rarely 
registered ..., we were going to finally see whether or not the social could explain 
anything else. Chemists, rocket scientists, and physicists are used to seeing their la-
boratories explode, but it had been quite a while before the sociologist’s office could 
run an experiment risky enough even to have a chance to fail! And, this time, it did 
explode. After a week in Roger Guillemin’s laboratory thirty years ago, I remember 
how inescapable I found the conclusion: the social cannot be substituted for the tiniest 
polypeptide, the smallest rock, the most innocuous electron, the tamest baboon. 
Objects of science may explain the social, not the other way around. No experience 
was more striking than what I saw with my own eyes: the social explanation had 
vanished into thin air.72
This failure of social explanation led Latour to reformulate the notion 
of explanation itself and to remodel the concept of objectivity.
While the traditional notion of objectivity constructs the value-free 
realm of scientific research by demanding an unrealistic ability of the sci-
entist to assume God’s view, the notion elaborated by Latour, presumes a 
particular position among, and engagement of the scientist with those with 
whom he “connects through some research protocol”.73 Such a notion of 
objectivity does not rely on godly impartiality but on a relatively simple 
principle of letting the studied objects object to what the scientists say 
 71 The notion of purely quantitative – not qualitative – difference between ordinary and 
scientific practices of the production of knowledge and order is dealt with in the last 
paragraphs of the section “Introducing the principle of symmetry”.
 72 B. Latour, Reassembling the Social…, 98-99.
 73 B. Latour, “On Recalling ANT…”, 20.
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about them.74 While natural scientists do not need to care much about the 
ability of their objects to object to what they have to say about them, the 
people studied by social scientists are much more careful and polite.75
If many more precautions have to be taken with human subjects, it is not because 
humans should not be treated like ‘mere things’ devoid of intentionality, conscious-
ness and reflexivity, as interpretative schools would have it; nor is it, as the quantita-
tive schools think, because they would influence the result, but, on the contrary, be-
cause they would quickly lose their recalcitrance by complying with what scientists 
expect of them. Contrary to microbes and electrons who never abandon their capaci-
ty to object since they are not easily influenced by the interest of experiments, too 
remote from their own conatus (not to say interest), humans are so easily subjected to 
influence that they play the role of an idiotic object perfectly well, as soon as white 
coats ask them to sacrifice their recalcitrance in the name of higher scientific goals 
(this is what happened in Milgram’s lab whose experiment proves nothing more than 
that a psychologist can indeed be the torturer of his students!).76
Therefore, the social scientist is in a more difficult position when pre-
paring the conditions in which his “laboratory” might “explode”. In order 
for it to “explode”, Bruno Latour says,
social scientists had to study something that was higher, harder, and stronger than 
them. For the first time, the explanandum resisted and grinded the teeth of the expla-
nans’ cogs to mere stumps. Not only that, but the screams of those being studied 
could be heard loud and clear – and they were not coming from Bali, the ghettos, TV 
studios, corporate board rooms, or the US Senate, but from departments next door, 
from colleagues in the very same hiring and grant committees.
Now, at last, it was time to carry out in the social sciences the experiment which had 
never been carried out before: What proof do we have that a social explanation holds 
when we study up? When the reactions of those studied cannot be ignored? When the 
‘cultural capital’ of those studied is infinitely higher than those doing the study? 
When the objects to be replaced by ‘social force’ are obviously much stronger, va-
ried, longer lasting than this very social force that is supposed to explain them? When 
the truths to be explained are equally valued by those who study and by those who 
are studied as the only treasure on earth worth fighting for?77
According to me these criticisms, reformulations, and principles by 
Latour need to be taken very serious if we value the quality of knowledge 
produced by our scientific practice. However, incorporating them is far 
more difficult than just making a decision to subscribe to them. What I 
wanted to add in this article is that the means for silencing the “objecting 
objects” can be quite discreet. Despite consciously and actively adopting a 
very symmetrical approach during field work; being respective and em-
 74 B. Latour, “When Things Strike Back…”, 114-115.
 75 Ibid., 115-116.
 76 Ibid., 116.
 77 B. Latour, Reassembling the Social..., 98-99.
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pathic to the participants and making notes as respectfully as possible, we 
are in the end alone with the data we have produced. It is us who interpret 
the data during the analytical process. In addition, it is hard to introduce 
the same symmetry one encounters in the field in settings where one is 
alone with her/his data. This is due to the fact that the analytical process is 
devoid of the feedback the researcher gets through interaction with the 
subjects. The possibilities to silence the objections are almost unlimited 
even if we subscribe to the principle of symmetry and try to be reflexive 
in our endeavour. Consequently, this becomes even harder when not sub-
scribing to these principles at all. As Latour shows, the political power of 
the “objects” is important. As was shown in the case of Lenka, it was the 
open confrontation in the field and the specific conditions that gave her 
political power over my research and made me think more carefully of 
what I said about her in my analysis.
Conclusion
Usually, journal papers in social sciences comprise of a collection of 
descriptions of social interactions. For this paper I have focussed on one 
minor aspect of such behaviour and how my description exploded. When 
everything goes right and nothing explodes, then such articles may be 
filled with harmful descriptions about the people who have entered the 
account. All this violence passes unnoticed and bad theory comes as a re-
sult: bad in the sense that it (1) fails to grasp the problem in its full com-
plexity, (2) fails to take into account some crucial data and (3) sides with 
particular parties. By “bad theory”, I do not simply mean morally bad be-
cause of its violence; I rather mean “blind” to crucial information present 
in our data set. Simply put, such theories are bad in that they lack depth, 
transparency, and objectivity.
The case in question has thus shown that: (1) it is difficult to set up 
proper conditions, even for tiny explosions, and (2) such conditions come 
as a result of ethical and political decisions. These ethical considerations 
consist of the choice to refrain from using the power, given to us by the 
authority of the expert system we represent, over the participants in our 
research or the people represented in our accounts. The political decision 
consists of refraining from taking any privilege or dominance for granted,78 
i.e. a decision not to subscribe to, and to support, an established order. In 
this respect it is far from being conservative. In addition, this ethical and 
political decision can do more for the development of good and “objec-
tive” theory than the iron cage of any methodological canon or the naïve 
 78 See J. Law, Organizing Modernity..., 12.
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positivist notion of “objectivity”, which, first of all, prevents us effec-
tively from experiencing any kind of explosions and secondly, systemati-
cally veils our research practices by representing methodology as a means 
of impartiality and ethical and political disengagement.
In this context a statement, made by my friend and colleague Tomáš 
Kobes, comes to mind. During a lecture on participant observation he em-
phasised that ethnography, as a method, is the tool for doing real hard 
science. The argument he gave was that, during ethnographic fieldwork, 
the researcher gets constant feedback on her/his provisional theories 
through interactions with the participants. This statement is important. It is 
however not yet complete. Being in the field and making notes is only one 
part of the researchers’ work. And, moreover, it is not in the field where 
the researcher has the most power on her/his side. It often happens that 
she/he is dominated or even exploited in many ways by the participants.79 
Her/his power in this setting lies only in the routine of taking notes. Notes 
are something she/he can control, behind what she/he can hide, by means 
of what she/he can deal with the problems she/he faces in the field.80 The 
field notes help the researcher to handle the asymmetries related to her/his 
status as an outsider or newcomer. The real analytical work, however, 
starts when the researcher returns home, transcribes the notes, feeds the 
data into analytical software, and starts re-reading, commenting on, cod-
ing, comparing, memo-ing etc. Only at this point the researcher starts to 
play a “power play”, as Zdeněk Konopásek expressed it.81 Here she/he 
turns to the rich resources of technology and knowledge which have been 
amassed by generations of her/his colleagues and the opportunity for let-
ting “things strike back” decreases significantly. Therefore, at this point 
political and ethical considerations, which may enhance the quality of an 
emerging theory, need special attention. When face-to-face interaction 
with the participants is over, and so the relevance of political and ethical 
commitments seems to diminish, it is particularly important to bring poli-
tics and ethics into the research process again. This matters more than the 
procedures involved in concept construction, so precious to Weber, be-
cause this can once again enable “things” to strike back.
Weber should be taken serious, no doubt, but what he offers is not suf-
ficient. The risk of producing harmful analytical accounts cannot be 
avoided by any purely technical objective tool. As shown above, the solu-
tion must be moral and political. Basically it includes simply maximal 
 79 M. Vaňková, “Výzkumník lapený: Úvahy k (a)symetrii...”. See also A. Beláňová, 
“S kým povedu dialog...”.
 80 See A. Beláňová, “S kým povedu dialog...”, and E. E. Wheatley, “Risk, Reflexivity and 
an Elusory Body…”.
 81 Z. Konopásek, “Sociologie jako power play...”.
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honesty, respect, carefulness, and humbleness. It is very tempting to: re-
place what a participant means by something different but fitting the re-
searchers’ preconceptions, ignore or misinterpret data which does not 
conform with the emerging theory or, to miss crucial information because 
we took certain structures and power relations for granted. On the other 
hand, no precaution is as efficient as explicit, transparent and thorough 
note-taking, not only in the field, but also during the analytical process. 
This can be facilitated by the usage of an analytical tool which records 
each step of the analytical process and keeps track of every reason for a 
particular decision. As Zdeňek Konopásek explained,82 and Elizabeth 
Wheatley clearly demonstrated,83 reflexivity has nothing to do with a kind 
of meditative study of our mental processes. As a practice related to the 
research process it is based on our ability to analyse our own analytical 
work the same way as we analyse all other data presented in the form of a 
text which we can see, read, comment, code etc.
This type of study needs to be based on a strong ethical and political 
decision not to neglect anybody’s “good reasons” whatever her/his posi-
tion and role might be. In fact this approach is self-consciously demo-
cratic in the sense that it attempts to let every actor’s voice sound with the 
same strength.
However, this does mean methodological siding with the weaker as 
those who are in whatever given order marginalized. The researcher can-
not neglect that privileges exist and cannot neglect the perspective of the 
privileged. He cannot, however, produce an analytical account from the 
perspective of a privileged and say that it is “objective”. As affirmative 
action in politics is undertaken in order to establish equal conditions for 
all, including the underprivileged and marginalized, so methodological 
siding with the weaker establishes conditions for objectivity, or more ex-
actly, it helps to increase the quality of a theory. The decision to neglect 
the concept of religion is an important part of this attempt to make research 
better, it serves to safeguard symmetry. The term’s inherent connection to 
the particular asymmetrical order inscribed in what Latour calls Great 
Divide makes the term “religion” too strongly rooted in modernity with all 
its asymmetries. This inscribed asymmetry cannot be methodologically 
controlled. It carries in itself too many privileges.
 82 Z. Konopásek, “Text a textualita v sociálních vědách III...”.
 83 E. E. Wheatley, “Risk, Reflexivity and an Elusory Body...”.
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SUMMARY
What Would an Informant Tell Me after Reading My Paper? On the Theoretical 
Significance of Ethical Commitment and Political Transparency in the Symmetrical 
Practice of Studying Religion(s)
This article introduces the methodological principle of symmetry as developed in science 
and technology studies (STS). However simple in its formulation, this principle is unexpect-
edly complex in practice and has far-reaching consequences. Adherence to the principle of 
symmetry in the study of religion(s) is one promising avenue through which practical solu-
tions to many theoretical and methodological problems may be formulated in response to 
postmodern and postcolonial critique of the study of religion(s) as well as of the modern 
scientific practice in general.
The aim of this article is to demonstrate the promises of the symmetrical approach, the 
ways of its practical enactment, the complications of this enactment, and some solutions for 
these complications. The arguments and demonstrations provided here show that: (1) de-
marcating the research field of the study of religion(s) through the concept “religion” in it-
self creates asymmetries which contradict the aims of the discipline as an objective empiri-
cal and theoretical study; (2) the practical enactment of the principle of symmetry demands 
taking important ethical and political decisions in order to prepare the practical conditions 
for research and analysis, analogical to the practical conditions actively fostering democratic 
negotiation and handling inequalities through affirmative action; (3) making these decisions 
and maintaining these conditions is necessary in order to achieve theoretical objectivity and 
build good and transparent theories; and (4) being faithful to these decisions during the 
process of data analysis is extremely complicated and can only be more or less successfully 
achieved on the basis of (a) high degree of ethical commitments towards the participants in 
research which empower them politically in relation to the researcher and the research itself, 
and (b) by analysing the process of data collection and analysis in exactly the same way (i.e. 
symmetrically) as the activities of all other actors engaged in the research. In this sense 
modernist ideas concerning moral and political disengagement as the condition for neutra-
lity, objectivity and truth are reversed with reference to postcolonial criticism and show how 
proclaimed neutrality, objectivity and truth justifications are based on and foster power 
domination, suffering and exploitation of the marginalized.
Keywords: study of religion(s); research methodology; research ethics; politics of research; 
reflexivity; principle of symmetry; symmetrical approach; ethnography; postcolonialism; 
insecure practices of pragmatic management of uncertainty; instrumentally rational practi-
ces of pragmatic problem solving; democracy; risk society.
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